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In the following we present ve essays that constitute the core of my PhD thesis. The
essays connect with each other not so much in terms of one common overarching
theme, but rather in terms of the methods of attacking the problems analyzed.
Out of the ve essays, two (Chapter 1 and 4) were written with Barna Bakó, one
(Chapter 3) with Barna Bakó, Zombor Berezvai and Enik® Vigh, and two essays
(Chapter 3 and 5) are self-authored. The thesis will be structured as follows: in the
introduction, we will go through common themes or methodological insights that
connect the essays. In particular, we will outline a case for the continued relevance
of applied theory in economic research and briey present the results we arrived at
in each of the essays. The remainder of the thesis consists of the essays themselves.
2 Heads in the Sand:Information Aversion in a Mar-
ket Context
In this chapter we examine the issue of misinformation in product markets from
a perspective dierent to those taken so far in the economic literature. Most of
the literature has been exclusively concerned with the incentives of producers to
misinform consumers, while consumers themselves have typically been assumed to be
exogenously deceivable, or irrational. In this essay, we show that misinformation can
be an equilibrium even in the case of consistently utility-maximizing consumers. This
is because consumers might form some attachment for the product they consume
which makes it costly for them to learn damaging information about it later on. In
other words, consumers have incentives to avoid information about certain products.
We assume a mass of consumers normalized to 1, each with a unit demand
and deriving a utility of v(A) from consumption, where A ∈ {0, a} denotes two
possible values product quality can take with a subjective probability of φ consumer
attaches to product quality being a instead of 0 and we assume that v(0) = 0, while
0 < v(a) ≤ 1. Furthermore, we assume that consumers derive utility (or disutility)
directly from the information about product quality. If a consumer receives infor-
mation that the product quality is lower than her prior assessment, she receives a
disutility in form of psychic cost. Let this psychic cost (measured in money-metric
utility), denoted by ei, be a characteristic of the consumers i, and we assume that
consumers are uniformly distributed along a unit line with regards of this psychic
cost, i.e. ei ∈ [0, 1]. Specically, we assume that the utility can be written in the
following form
Ui(A, ei) = v(A)− u(ei) (1)
where u(·) is continuous and increasing function, while U ′(ei) < 0 and U ′′(ei) ≥ 0.
In the second period after consuming the product consumers receive informa-
tion about the product quality and decide whether to listen to this information. Not
listening to new information is a form of information aversion and we can interpret
it in various ways. Consumers could literally 'close their ears' to new information,
or if they hear new information, they could nevertheless disregard it, clinging to
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their prior beliefs instead. Based on our assumptions, consumer i.listens to new
information if and only if
φv(a) ≥ ei (2)
where the left-hand side of the inequality is the benet of listening to new infor-
mation, which equals with the price of the product she saves by not consuming the
low-quality product.
2.1 Laissez-faire
Total welfare and consumer welfare under laissez-faire can be written as




ψ(Z) (φv(a) + ∆2) + (1− ψ(Z))(1− φv(a))φv(a)− IZ
and




where ∆t = v(a)−φv(a) = (1−φ)v(a) is the consumer surplus enjoyed by consumers
consuming high-quality product in period t, where t = 1, 2.
2.2 Tort law
In this section we explore the eects of tort law on consumer and rm behavior. We
assume that consumers have the opportunity to sue the rm at a xed cost s (with
s ≥ 0) when the product is of bad quality. Furthermore, we assume that the court
might not decide in favour of the plainti even though the product is low quality.
The probability that the court rules in favor of the rm in case when it produces a
low-quality products is η, where η ≥ 0. The compensation awarded to the plainti
is equal to the price paid for the product, i.e φv(a).
If the consumer chooses not to get informed she will never sue the rm. How-
ever, a well-informed consumer might launch a lawsuit against the rm if
(1− η)φv(a) > s (5)
holds.
Notice that the possibility of starting a lawsuit against the rm alters the
incentive of the consumer to learn about the product quality. Thus, with tort law
consumer i listens to new information if
φv(a) + (1− η)φv(a)− s ≥ ei (6)
in case when (5) holds. On the other hand, if (5) is not satised, then consumers
behave as in the case of laissez-faire and listen to new information as long as (2)
holds. In what follows we assume that (1− η)φv(a) > s holds.1
1Notice that we assume that the consumer will not sue the rm if she is indierent between
suing or not suing.
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From (6) follows that the number of informed consumers is e∗ = φv(a)(2−η)−s.
The rm's expected prot can be written as follows
Eπ = φv(a)− (1− ψ(Z))(1− η)e∗φv(a) + ψ(Z) max{e∗v(a), φv(a)}+




φv(a)[1− (1− ψ(Z))((2− η)e∗ − 1)] + ψ(Z)v(a)e∗ − IZ s < φ[(2− η)v(a)− 1]
φv(a)[1− (1− ψ(Z))((2− η)e∗ − 1)] + ψ(Z)v(a)φ− IZ s ≥ φ[(2− η)v(a)− 1] (8)
Maximizing (8) with respect to Z, we get the following rst-order conditions
ψ′(Z)v(a)[(φ((2− η)e∗ − 1) + e∗] = I (9)
if s < φ[(2− η)v(a)− 1],
ψ′(Z)φv(a)(2− η)e∗ = I (10)
if s ≥ φ[(2− η)v(a)− 1].
Notice, that the marginal benet from the innovation unsurprisingly decreases
in η and s in both cases. Moreover, the optimal level of innovation increases in φ
and v(a).
Total and consumer welfare under tort law can be given as follows:










ψ(Z)e∗v(a) s < φ[(2− η)v(a)− 1]
ψ(Z)(φv(a) + ∆2) s ≥ φ[(2− η)v(a)− 1]
(11)
while






0 s < φ[(2− η)v(a)− 1]
ψ(Z)(∆2) s ≥ φ[(2− η)v(a)− 1]
where again ∆t = (1 − φ)v(a) is the consumer surplus enjoyed by consumers con-
suming high-quality product in period t, where t = 1, 2.
2.3 Regulation
Another possible policy response is quality regulation. The regulator may ban the
sale of products advertised as having a quality level a when it judges the actual
quality level to be 0. Furthermore, we allow for the possibility that the regulator
makes a mistake: it may not ban a product advertised as a although its actual quality
level is 0. This can happen for various reasons: the regulator might have imperfect
information about the product, or the rm may bribe the regulator to allow its
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product onto the market.2 We capture all of these possibilities in a single probability
parameter: let the probability of regulatory mistake be λ. Furthermore, we assume
that consumers have some level of trust in the regulator and as a consequence update
their prior belief that the product is a high quality from φ to φ̂, where φ̂ ≥ φ.
Moreover, we also assume that φ̂ decreases in λ and if λ = 0, i.e. regulation always
screens out the bad product, the consumers will have complete trust in the product,
i.e. φ̂ = 1. On the other hand, if λ = 1, i.e. regulation never screens out the bad
product, then φ̂ = φ, i.e. the existence of regulation will not aect the consumers'
believes about the product quality.
Let us rst examine the rm's pricing and investment decisions under reg-
ulation. Initially, the rm can always sell any quality at φ̂v(a). In the second-
consumption period the high-quality product is sold on a price of either v(a) (to
those who choose to be informed) or φ̂v(a) (to all consumers). However, notice that
φ̂v(a)2 is never greater than φ̂v(a), thus as in the case of laissez-faire the rm is
always better-o by serving all consumers. Yet, in the second-consumption period
if the product is low-quality but the regulator approves it the rm can sell the prod-
uct only to the consumers who choose to remain ignorant, at a price φ̂v(a). If the
regulator does not approve the low-quality product the rm makes zero prot at
this last period.
Thus, the rm's expected prot can be written as
Eπ = ψ(Z)(2φ̂v(a)) + (1− ψ(Z))λ[φ̂v(a) + (1− φ̂v(a))φ̂v(a)]− IZ (13)
Taking the rst derivative of equation (13) with respect to Z yields the follow-
ing rst-order condition
ψ′(Z)φ̂v(a)[2− λ(2− φ̂v(a))] = I (14)
Notice that, the higher the probability of mistaken regulation, the lower the
incentive of the rm to innovate. Moreover, the eect of v(a) and φ on innovation is
positive. Intuitively a higher expected valuation means that more consumers choose
to get informed and at the same time if regulation works reasonably well the rm
can gain more if it produces a high-quality product. These eects increase the rm's
incentive to innovate.
Total welfare and consumer welfare under regulation can be given as
WR = ψ(Z)[2φ̂v(a) + ∆̂1 + ∆̂2] + (1− ψ(Z))λ
[













where ∆̂t = (1 − φ̂)v(a) is the consumer surplus enjoyed by consumers consuming
high-quality product in period t, where t = 1, 2.
2One source of mistake might be that the product performs dierently in the trial period




In this essay we have analyzed the eect of information avoidance in a market
setting. We show that consumers' tendency to stay uninformed can persist even
with zero physical information costs. However, market as well as institutional forces
can dampen the eect of information avoidance. In particular, stict tort liability
or ex ante product regulation can increase welfare, however, relying only on market
forces (i.e. laissez-faire) can lead to better outcomes in certain cases. Our ndings
add to the growing comparative literature on tort law and regulation, as we argue
that one advantage of tort law, not emphasized in the literature so far, is that it
increases consumers' incentives to get informed.
3 Does Uber Aect Bicycle-Sharing Usage? Evi-
dence from a Natural Experiment in Budapest
3.1 Introduction
This chapter assesses the impact of the exit of Uber from Budapest on BSS ridership.
3.2 Methodology
BSS related data were provided by the system operator, Centre for Budapest Trans-
port. The dataset contains start date, end date, start station, end station, and
ticket type (pass or ticket) for all the trips occurred in 2015 and 2016. Usage pat-
terns show signicant seasonality (see Figure 1), BSS is much more utilized during
summertime. Since the exit of Uber happened in the middle of summer (July 24,
2016), we decided to use the summer periods only, i.e., from June 1 to August 31
for both years. This shorter sample makes it possible to analyze the most utilized
periods. Additionally, the shorter period enables a regression discontinuity-type of
analysis that is often used in treatment eect identications (?) to mitigate the
unobservable changes that might occur in a larger time window.
Trip data were summarized into number of trips by day, generating station
and ticket type.
Ticket Type Weekday Weekend Total
Pass 336,400 98,334 434,734
Ticket 49,771 27,034 76,805
Total 386,171 125,368 511,539
Table 1: Number of trips for the summers of 2015 and 2016
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the data used. It shows that regular users
use BSS more often on weekdays, which can be attributed to commuting to work.
On the other hand, ad hoc users use the service more frequently during weekends.
6
Figure 1: Daily usage frequencies of the Budapest BSS (total number of trips per
day)
In this study, we exploit the fact that Uber was available in the whole summer
of 2015, but its service was terminated in the middle of 2016. We use the data of
2015 as a counterfactual for 2016. The rst half of the summer of 2016 enables us
to identify the usage dierences between the two summers, and thus, estimate the
impact of Uber as a treatment eect. We created the dierence between the 2015
and 2016 data to analyze the changes between the two summers. More specically,
since subtracting the same day (e.g., July 1, 2015 from July 1, 2016) might cause a
bias in comparing a weekday to a weekend day, we always subtracted the same types
of days from each other (i.e., a Sunday was subtracted from the closest Sunday a
year before). In this way we capture the changes in trip generation by station, day
and ticket type between the two summers.
The dataset allowed us to separate users based on ticket types, that is, to
dierentiate regular users (who are using the service with passes) from ad hoc users
(who are using the service with tickets). Some data cleaning was required to elim-
inate invalid entries. If a trip was no longer than 1 minute or either the start or
the nal station was missing, the trip was deleted from the database. After this
cleaning, 511,539 trips remained in our database. The majority (85%) of the usage
was generated by regular users and only 15% was connected to tickets. Furthermore,
the service is more frequently used on weekdays, and only 25% of the total usage is
connected to weekends (Saturdays and Sundays) (see Table 1).
Our model can be written in the following general form:
∆yit = β∆Ubert + Γ∆xit + ci + uit (17)
3.3 Regression results
The previous section revealed some interesting patterns regarding BSS usage. Yet,
the changes in usage patterns might not solely be driven by the presence or absence
of Uber, but be inuenced by many other factors as well. As we have argued in the
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Variable Obs. Mean Median Standard Min Max
deviation
Number of trips per station 12,496 26.9 23 16.9 0 144
with pass on weekdays
Number of trips per station 4,950 19.9 16 16.2 0 148
with pass on weekends
Number of trips per station 12,496 4.0 2 5.8 0 61
with ticket on weekdays
Number of trips per station 4,950 5.5 2 7.6 0 69
with ticket on weekends
Number of stations 184 95.2 98 5.4 76 99
PET scores (hourly data) 4,416 18.4 17.5 6.7 5.7 36
Total daily precipitation (mm) 184 2.5 0 7.8 0 66
Table 2: Summary statistics
previous section weather conditions, network size and station-specic characteristics
might impact the usage of BSS, therefore a more thorough analysis in which we
control for these variables is necessary to determine the impact of Uber. More
specically, a xed eects panel model is estimated for the regression expressed in
equation (17). Table 3 summarizes the estimation results.
As we have mentioned earlier pass-holders predominantly use the BSS on week-
days, while ticket-buyers use it more often on weekends (see Table 1). For this reason
we concentrate our attention on the eects generated in these cases.
Estimation results for regular users (pass holders) are shown in the rst two
columns of Table 3. The rst column of the table indicates that Uber had a positive
eect on BSS usage during weekdays. The results suggest that the market exit of
Uber caused a decrease of around 1.74 trips on average per weekday per station.
Considering that the average trip generation of a station on weekdays was 26.9 (see
Table 2), this shows an approximate 6.5% decrease in trip generation. Given that
there were 96 BSS stations in Budapest in the time frame considered, the exit of
Uber ceteris paribus caused a decrease of around 167 rentings per weekday. These
results suggest a complementary relationship between the two services.
The third and fourth columns of Table 3 show results for ad hoc users, who
are using BSS with tickets. Results are exactly the opposite to the ones we observed
for regular users. The presence of Uber had a signicant negative eect on weekend
usage. In numbers, the exit of Uber resulted in a 1.26 increase in average daily trip
generation for a given station during weekends. This is rather substantial since it
shows an approximate 23% increase is BSS usage. These results indicate that ad
hoc users use the BSS as an alternative to Uber during weekends.
3.4 Regression results by time periods
Since the daily distribution of trips is uneven, we also investigated the eect of Uber
in dierent time periods of the day. This method enabled us to capture the temporal
dierences in usage and shed light on how users combined Uber and BSS within a
8
Variable Pass Ticket
Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uber 1.742*** 0.456 -0.404 -1.264***
(0.569) (0.655) (0.251) (0.375)
Network size -0.035 -0.107 0.036 -0.054
(0.056) (0.075) (0.025) (0.043)
PET: Moderate Cold -5.853*** -5.553*** -0.960*** -2.037***
(0.562) (0.788) (0.250) (0.451)
PET: Slight Cold -0.971*** -1.665*** -0.340*** 0.133
(0.291) (0.340) (0.130) (0.195)
PET: Moderate Heat -5.050*** -0.950 -1.214*** 0.181
(0.425) (0.638) (0.189) (0.365)
Precipitation: 05 mm -3.356*** -1.926*** -0.346** -1.431***
(0.365) (0.406) (0.163) (0.232)
Precipitation: > 5 mm -7.384*** -1.308** -1.062*** -0.600











N (sample size) 5,907 2,380 5,907 2,380
R2 0.273 0.257 0.053 0.113
Notes: reference category for PET is No Stress, for precipitation is 0 mm and
for the day of week dummies Monday and Saturday.
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 3: Estimation results
day. We identied ve time periods: dawn (1:00-7:00), morning peak (7:00-10:00),
midday (10:00-16:00), afternoon peak (16:00-20:00) and night (20:00-1:00).
Results are summarized in Table 4. Control variables were eliminated from the
table to reduce its size. More detailed results are presented in the Appendix. The
results shed light on the following patterns. For pass holders, Uber and BSS appear
to be complements especially in the afternoon commuting periods on weekdays. The
exit of Uber caused a signicant reduction in BSS usage during the afternoon peak
period and at night for these users. These ndings support our conjecture that the
presence of Uber might encourage commuters to leave their cars at home and use
a combination of other transportation modes, including BSS, instead. For ticket
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Variable Pass Ticket
Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dawn 0.024 0.459* 0.018 -0.031
(0.108) (0.246) (0.034) (0.064)
Morning 0.132 -0.170* -0.012 0.014
(0.133) (0.096) (0.036) (0.052)
Midday -0.275 -0.358 -0.105 -0.547**
(0.201) (0.267) (0.149) (0.236)
Afternoon 1.298*** -0.112 -0.131 -0.395**
(0.252) (0.281) (0.117) (0.187)
Night 0.745** 0.686* -0.120 -0.350***
(0.290) (0.364) (0.091) (0.135)
Notes: Fixed eect panel regression results (with an AR(1) error term in the
weekday subsamples) using network size, PET scores and precipitation as control
variables.
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 4: Eect of Uber on BSS usage by time periods
buyers, Uber and BSS appear to be substitutes, and this relationship is statistically
signicant throughout the day except at dawn and morning. This appears to be
convincing since a considerable share of the ticket users are tourists, who are likely
to start their city tour later during the day and may use either BSS, Uber, taxi
or public transport to travel within the city without having a plan to combine
these transportation modes. If Uber is not available, BSS obviously will get a
higher share. The more detailed results presented in the Appendix reveal somewhat
counter-intuitive eects for the control variable in some cases. In particular, slight
or moderate cold stress seem to have a positive eect on BSS usage especially in the
afternoons and at nights. One can speculate that these thermal conditions might
be even conducive to cycling on summer evenings.
3.5 Conclusion
In the past few years, several innovations were introduced in local transportation.
In this article, we analyzed the interaction between two new services, Uber and
bicycle-sharing.
In this article we exploit the fact that Uber exited from the Budapest market
after a regulatory change in the middle of 2016. This natural experiment makes it
possible to estimate the impact of Uber on BSS ridership. Our results suggest that
regular BSS users combine bicycle-sharing with Uber to commute, and, therefore,
banning Uber caused an around 6.5% decrease in BSS usage on weekdays among
regular users. On the other hand, ad hoc users mainly use BSS and Uber as substi-
tute services, especially during weekends and the exit of Uber caused a 23% increase
in BSS usage among these users on weekends.
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4 A Theory of Early and Late Specialization
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines incentives by parents to invest in their ospring's human
capital in two possible directions: investments can be made in human capital com-
plementary to specialized activities (such as musical training, sports or advanced
technical knowledge), or human capital that can be complementary, perhaps to
varying degrees, to many dierent activities (such as basic mathematical and read-
ing skills as well as non-cognitive human capital). General human capital is mostly
acquired in elementary and middle school, while college education is often the ter-
rain of specialization. Liberal studies degrees, however, can be said to provide a
fairly general stock of human capital. What determines if parents and their children
will have a liberal arts education or choose a specialized eld relatively early on?
This area of study has generally been neglected but we believe it is becoming more
important to study as it can shed light on the question of how technology-induced
labor demand shocks inuence investment in human capital. This essay primarily
studies the eects of uncertainty and changes in uncertainty related to future job
prospects. Early specialization can have advantages due to dynamic complemen-
tarities in the accumulation of human capital. Skills acquired later often build on
(general and specic) skills acquired earlier.
4.2 The Model
In the economy, there is a set s = (1, 2, ...., S) of activities a worker can specialize
in which we treat as exogenous. Parents can invest in human capital that increase
productivity only in a given specialized activityHs or in human capital that increases
productivity in all of the activities, H. LetWs denote the per unit "price" of human
capital, that is equal to the marginal product of the worker, that can be earned
in activity s. After investments by the parent, the adult child can invest further
in her specic human capital. We notate the stock of adult "training" Ht. We
make the following assumptions:W ′s(Hs) > 0, W
′
s(H) > 0, W
′′
s (Hs) < 0, W
′′
s (H) <
0,W ′s(Ht) > 0 and W
′′
s (Ht) < 0. or the sake of simplicity, let Ws = W0 + θsµs: W0
is a "basic rental price of human capital, while with some probability θs the adult




u(Cp) + aδmax {(W0 + θ1µ1)(H1, Ht, H); ...; (W0 + θsµs)(HS, H)} (18)
subject to the time constraint
T = Cp + h+ h1 + ...+ hS + f (19)
and the human capital production functions H = f(h) and Hs = f(hs) for every
s, where u(Cp) is the utility from the parent's own consumption, T is the "time
budget" of the parent, W0 is the "base" rental price of human capital, δ is the
discount factor, µs is the rent earned in sector s, θs is the probability of the rent
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occurring in sector s, h and hs are the time units spent on accumulating general and
specic human capital, respectively, and a is the altruism parameter.
The rst order conditions are
a
(






































Both general and specic skills produce two eects: they raise productivity directly,
as the rst term in each FOC shows, but they also contribute to further skill de-
velopment. Both general and specic skills contribute to later accumulated specic
skills. From the rst-order conditions, the following conditions are derived:











































































Equations (4.8) and (4.9) state that the marginal benet of investing in the child's
(general or specic) human capital must, in optimum, equal the marginal utility per
dollar of spending on the parent's own consumption. As usual in human capital
models, the more altruistic the parent is, the more she will invest in her child.
Equation (4.7) is "new", relative to earlier literature on human capital. It expresses
that the marginal return on investing in general and specic human capital must be
equal in optimum.
4.3 Castes and hereditary positions
4.3.1 "Separate but equal"
First we consider a case where there are no status doierences across the castes.
Assume there are n individuals, half of which belong to one demographic group and
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the other half to an other demographic group. In each group, half of the individuals
have a comparative advantage in task A, while the other half has a comparative
advantage in task B. Assume the market is in equilibrium when the number of
workers in each market is N
2
. Now let us write down the parnet's problem.




(W0 + µA)(HA, Ht, H) +
1
2
(W0 + µB)(HB, Ht, H,Ht)
)
. (25)
























for specic skills, as well as
a
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for general skills. Under a caste system, when one demographic group is "assigned"



















































for general human capital.
In a free economy, both markets are served by those with a comparative ad-
vantage in that sector. In parents face uncertainty over comparative advantage,
they invest relatively less in specic, but relatively more in general human capital,
compared to a caste system, where they are guaranteed a place in one sector, how-
ever, they may be among those with a comparative disadvantage (and hence those
without a rent earning capacity) in the sector.
4.3.2 Hierarchical castes
Consider the case of members of two "castes", with members of a higher caste
having exclusive rights to engage in sector I This leads the rest of the population
to shift their labor supply to sector II. The whole economy consists of these two
sectors. Production in the two sectors depends entirely on labor input augmented
by human capital. The goods produced by the sectors may be net substitutes,
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complements, or there may be a Cobb-Douglas preference relation between them.
We assume that demand and supply conditions are such that originally wages are
equal in the two sector, but due to perhaps some legislative change the supply
curve in industry I. becomes steeper above a certain quantity level, due to increased
barriers to entry. First we consider a very general case. We assume human capital
production functions Hs(, as, hs) where as is ability related to accumulating human
capital specic to sector s as well as H(h) for general human capital. The adult child
can supplement her earlier education with "training, which can be characterized by
the production function Ht(as, ht, hs, h). The wage equations in sector I is given as
WI = (W0 + µI)(Ht, HI , H), (30)
while in sector II it can be written as
WII = (W0 − µII)(Ht, HII , H). (31)


















































































































Who belongs to a privileged "class" is not always clear. Consider a less extreme
version of our model: as above, there are two sectors, with barrier to entry in
sector I. More formally, we can reformulate the above maximization problem by
introducing a probability of being in a favored position θ, so that the expected
wage in sector I becomes θ(W0 + µI)(Ht, HI , H) and the expected wage in sector
II becomes (1− θ)(W0 − µII)(Ht, HII , H). If the former is greater than the latter,
even if the probability of being privileged is not high, the agent will invest in human
capital specic to sector I. This is a further source of misallocation of resources, as
if θ is relatively low while it is still worthy for the agent to invest in human capital
specic for sector I, the specic human capital accumulated would likely not be
used.
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Figure 2: Marginal benet and cost of "tightening the caste system"
There is a potential tradeo between investment eciency and talent alloca-
tion. Under "equal opportunity", parents invest in their children according to their
natural talents (for the sake of simplicity we assumed that there is no uncertainty
over ability, or, if they have equal talent in each sector, the parents choose a sector
randomly. Both talent allocation and investment are ecient. However, consider
any situation where there is some non-meritocratic "assignment" of individuals to
dierent sectors. Talent allocation is, to some extent, already hurt. If the assignment
becomes stricter, it further aggravate the talent allocation ineciency, however, it
also leads those whose (children's) talents have already been "misallocated" to in-
vest more in their human capital as they know more certainly which sector their
child will work in. Note that the marginal cost of misallocation decreases in the
"strictness" of assignment: if there is already a strong enough level of ex-ante as-
signment into professions, fewer potential labor will be newly misallocated. At the
same time, the marginal benet of further tightening of roles is also diminishing.
If, however, the former decreases faster than the latter, the marginal benet curve
will intersect the marginal cost curve from below.3 If θ goes above this point, then
the marginal benet will exceed marginal cost, hence, society will converge toward
a strict hereditary system as long as there are societal pressures toward eciency.
If, however, θ goes below the intersection, societal pressures will likely be created
to move toward equal opportunity, that is, the rst-best ecient outcome. There
is one more reason why a strict system of social roles might be second-best: in an
intermediate case, there is substantial "malinvestment" in human capital, in that
families are "lured" into making investments specic to the more lucrative sector,
yet many of these families will end up being shut out of that sector, making their
investment a waste. Our reasoning is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
3More formally, the marginal benet of an increase in θ can be expressed as (W0 +




dθ which is decreasing in θ given concavity assumptions. The marginal
cost on the other hand is γ(θ)(Hs(as
′)H −Hs(as))H, where γ is the fraction of individuals newly
"assigned" to one of the sectors, with γ′(θ) < 0.
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4.4 Gender roles and the sexual division of labor
Suppose that before an individual enters the marriage market, her parent faces
a choice of whether to invest in household or in market specic human capital,
apart from human capital that earns a return in both sectors, and the parent also
determines the optimal human capital investment. The "wage" in the household
sector is determined by innate ability Ah, a "market premium" on household work
µ, the adult child's share in the marital surplus α and the probability that this
market premium is realized, θh.
The expected "wage" in the household sector is
Wh = Ahθhαµ(Ht, Hh, H), (38)
while in the market sector it can be written as
Wm = (1− θh)AmαW (Ht, Hm, H). (39)
The parent will invest in household human capital if Ahθhµ > (1 − θh)AmW ,




After deciding which industry to prepare her child for, the parent then decides on
how much money or time to allocate to industry-specic and to industry-neutral
human capital investments.
If the parent prepares the child for the household sector, the rst order condi-

















If the parent prepares the child to work in the market, the rst order condition with






































From this we obtain the "usual" conditions that marginal benet from specic












































































The essay considered the choice problem of individuals (typically parents of children)
to invest in human capital that is sector-specic and human capital that is general
and increases productivity equally in all sectors. Our ndings are quite intuitive:
when individuals can reap large returns in a given industry, they will invest more in
human capital specic to that industry. Also, if an industry is aected by a positive
demand shock at a higher probability, specic investment increases while investment
in general human capital may also increase if there is complementarity between the
two, although its share decreases. The presence of industries where either there
exists a large rent on natural talent or where entry is limited leads to more specic
human capital investments. Higher uncertainty over future labor market prospects
increase the share of general investments and decrease share of specic investments,
while potentially leading to less overall human capital investment. We also consid-
ered two specic cases: hereditary or "caste" systems and socialization along gender
lines. In both cases there can be a tradeo between investment eciency and talent-
allocation as well as an eciency-equity tradeo. In modern economies, this latter
tradeo is less likely to occur, while the former is less stark.
5 Supernatural Persuasion in the Family and in Pol-
itics
This chapter, co-authored with Barna Bakó, considers the use of religious and other
supernatural stories aimed at inuencing the behavior of others. In particular, we
focus on two contexts where this type of persuasion has been important throughout
human history: the family and the relation between a ruler and those rued by him.
5.1 Parent-child interaction
Consider the following full information game parents and their children play with
each other. First, the child decides whether to behave well or badly. The parent
observes this behavior and decides whether to give out a reward (R) or a punishment
(P ) for the observed behavior (assuming that parents will never choose to reward
their children for bad, or punish their children for good behavior), or whether to do
nothing. . Let the cost of reward be C and the cost of punishment be (1+a)C, where
a is an exogenous parameter, and- following Becker (1991)'s notation - denotes the
extent of parental altruism. Parents receive a payo B if their child behaves well
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and a payo of −B when the child behaves badly. We assume that the child has a
cost D of good behavior, possibly in the form of unrealized gains from bad behavior
and his utility is −D in the case of good behavior if he does not receive any reward
for it, and δR −D if he receives the reward, where δ is the child's discount factor.
His utility is 0 if he behaves badly but does not get punished while he gets −δP if he
gets punished. Suppose that it is always utility-enhancing for the parent to enforce
good behavior, so that B −C > 0 and 2B − (1 + a)C > 0. Moreover, let us assume
that δR > D, so that the reward is sucient to ensure good behavior. The unique
equilibrium of this game in a one-shot case is that the child behaves badly and the
parent does not punish the child.
5.2 Santa Claus as a solution
Assume that parents tell the following story about Santa's utility function: Santa
Claus receives a fraction γ of the parent's utility and disutility B and −B and
incurs a cost S of distributing gifts where S < C as well as (1 +µ)S for distributing
penalties, where µ can be thought of as the extent of Santa Claus' "altruism" toward
children. We assume that the decision of Santa Claus is always binary (he either
rewards/punishes or does nothing), and the arguments of his utility function are
separable. Santa's discount factor is δs > δ. His utility when children in each period
behave well and do not get rewarded is γB+γB/(1−δs), γB+(γB−S)/(1−δs)−S
when children behave well and get rewarded, −γB − γB/(1 − δs) when children
behave badly and do not get punished, while it is −γB + (−γB − (1 + µ)S)/(1 −
δs)−(1+µ)S when children behave badly and get punished. In a one-shot case, Santa
never punishes the child and does not reward the child under good behavior, similarly
to the parent. However, suppose Santa's action in each period can be observed by
children in the next period. Then if Santa rewards and punishes conditionally, he
will get a higher utility in the next period, if and only if 2δsB− (1 +µ)S > 0. As he
plays the game innitely, the condition can be rewritten as 2B/(1−δs)−(1+µ)S > 0.
Thus, if Santa Claus is patient enough (a high δs) and has low enough reward and
punishment cost S and cares relatively little about short-term disutility of children
(a low µ), conditional reward and punishment is a best response to good and bad
behavior by the child, respectively. To solve for the equilibrium, consider also the
child's problem. A given child in any time period has the same payos in each
case as in the one-shot and nitely repeated game. Since we assumed earlier that
δR > D, a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium exists in which the child behaves
well and Santa Claus rewards the child. The question arises, however, whether the
parent has an incentive to play as if she were Santa Claus.
In this section we have considered the application of basic economic principles
to supernatural persuasion within a family context, focusing on the supply and
demand for the idea of Santa Claus as a distributor of rewards among children. We
have shown how in a one-shot or nitely repeated full information game between
a parent and a child the parent has a basic time inconsistency problem when it
comes to incentivizing her ospring. This problem can be overcome with the use of
supernatural persuasion. Our outline implies that the use of Santa Claus-type stories
increases in household income and in children's information costs, and - mainly due
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to changing information costs - decreases with children's age.
5.3 Religious persuasion in politics
5.4 The Model
We dene the following parameters for our model: a citizen can earn w wage per
time spent in the legal sector (xi), while she can also earn w per time spent in the
illegal sector (yi). An attempted theft is successful with probability η. If the theft
is unsuccessful, then the thief is caught and is given a punishment f . A citizen's
legally obtained income can be stolen with probability ηn−1, where n is the number
of citizens. The amount of legal income that is not stolen is subject to a linear
income tax τ . Apart from the possible legal punishment, a citizen spending time
in the illegal sector also receives a perceived "divine or moral punishment θ,
which depends on the level of religious persuasion directed toward the citizenry. We
set θ =
√
g, where g is the amount of resources spent on persuasion. We assume
that persuasion occurs through the mediation of the "church. In this we take an
approach that is close to how economists model advertising and platform markets.
Most television program providers earn their revenues from selling advertisements.
The model's sequence is the following: rst, the church decides on how much
to spend on religious persuasion and how much on the religious service churchgoers
value. Next, the leader chooses the tax rate. Finally, citizens choose how much to
work in the legal and in the illegal sector. We rst solve for the citizen's optimal
choice. The citizen maximizes
Vc = w((1− τ)xi − ηn−1y−i + ηyi)− ((1− η)f +
√
g)yi − xi2 − yi2 (45)
with respect to xi and yi, where xi is the time and other resources spent in the
legal, while yi is the resources spent in the illegal sector.







η(w + f)− f −√g
2
. (47)
Note that if η is suciently low, yi would take a negative value, which is




Taking into account the citizen's future behavior, the leader decides on the
applied tax rate. We assume the leader maximizes tax revenue. Tax revenue is the
tax rate times the gross domestic product. GDP can be obtained by multiplying
xi by n and w and subtracting from it the amount stolen, which is obtained by
















g) + w − η2(f + w)
2w
. (49)
Taking the choice of the leader into account the church decides on the amount
of resources spent on persuasion.




g) + w − η2(f + w))
4
− cgg − css. (50)
The church maximizes the objective function with respect to g and s.












































































We now compute the equilibrium in a case where the leader does not hire
the church for persuasion, but instead relies only on physical law enforcement.
The utility function of the citizen is now
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Vc = w((1− τ)xi − ηn−1y−i + ηyi)− (1− η)fyi − xi2 − yi2, (56)
that is, the citizen does not receive a "supernatural punishment.





while the optimal yi is
yi =
η(w + f)− f
2
. (58)











Maximizing with respect to τ we obtain the optimal tax rate
τ =
η(f − η(f + w)) + w
2w
. (60)
Plugging the equilibrium values into the tax revenue we obtain












The church's incentive to invest in persuasion increases in the size of the pop-
ulation, the marginal product of labor, the share the church gets of the tax revenue,
and, importantly, on the probability of successful stealing, while it decreases, obvi-
ously, in the unit cost of persuasion. Importantly, regarding population size, we nd







cg(1− η)(w + η(f + w))
αη2w
(62)
Essentially there are increasing returns to scale in persuasion. The more people
hear the message, the higher will be the benet from religious indoctrination.
Naturally, we are also interested in the eect of η on whether the leader will
rely on the church's persuasive powers. To keep the analysis tractable, we focus on




w = 1, f = 1
2




and α3 = 0, 9. From gure it is clear that the dierence between the leader's
revenue when he does not rely on the church and his revenue when he does rely on
it decreases monotonically in n and η. Intuitively, the harder it is to prevent and
prosecute crime, the greater the benet from relying on persuasion.
Our model presents us a number of further comparative statics results. First,
we can say something about the eects of the elasticity of labor supply. The more
elastic labor supply is, the lower the equilibrium tax rate, and thus the lower is the
leader's incentive to increase the tax base through persuasion. Second, the more
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dicult it is to enforce laws through physical force (e.g. by maintaining a police
force, corresponding to a higher η), the more does the leader rely on supernatural
persuasion. Third, we can also say something about the church's ability to channel
supernatural persuasion. The more churchgoers value the free service provided by
the church, the more the church will spend on persuasion. Finally, there are some
more obvious comparative statics implications. Persuasion decreases in the cost of
persuasion, and also in the cost of the provision of church service. Although social
inuences and other ways of upholding public order and incentivizing pro-social
behavior are not part of our model, we can hypothesize that when it is harder to
observe individuals' behavior, it is more worthwhile to rely on religious persuasion.
For a believer, God sees and knows everything.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we considered the use of religious and other supernatural persuasion
in two settings: the persuasion supplied by parents in order to inuence the behavior
of their children, and persuasion supplied by a leader of a country who co-opts the
church into using religious persuasion to steer citizens away from unproductive and
toward productive activities. In the rst context, supernatural persuasion is used
in order to solve a commitment problem. In the second setting, it is used especially
when laws against theft and other rent-seeking activities are hard to enforce. In
both settings, one attractive feature of supernatural persuasion is that supernatural
stories usually posit an omniscient being, therefore they can be especially useful
when monitoring costs are high.
Toward an Economics of Moral Character
6 Introduction
In this chapter we propose the integration of ancient theories about moral character
(present in what is called virtue ethics as well as in common sense morality) into
the human capital literature in general, and the literature on non-cognitive skills in
particular.
6.1 Character in consumption
First, we consider the case of a paternalist parent. We start from and extend the
rational addiction model of Becker and Murphy (1988). We analyze three periods.
In period one the parent invests in virtue or moral character for her only child, and in
the second and third period the adult child makes consumption choices. The return
on virtue has multiple dimensions: rst, we allow for the possibility that virtue
eects adult utility directly, either in a positive or negative way (being virtuous might
bring with itself a sense of pride but occasionally also a sense of guilt). Second, virtue
decreases the marginal utility of consuming "harmful or "immoral goods, which
in turn depletes the consumption capital resulting from consuming the harmfully
addictive good, and through this, increases adult utility (indirectly). Third, as
consumption of harmfully addictive goods can also lower earnings, virtue can have
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the additional benet of indirectly increasing the wealth of the adult child. Assume a
utility function with the form U(x, y, S, V ), where x is a composite good, y is a good
or activity with certain "harmful properties, S is the stock of past consumption of
y, while V is the stock of virtue capital. We establish the following relationships.
S aects the marginal utility from consuming or doing y (UyS > 0), while the stock
of virtue capital decreases its marginal utility (UyV < 0). The individual maximizes
her utility subject to the constraint pxx + pyy + pgg + wt = W (y, V ), where W is
the individual's full wage (including both the wage rate as well as hours worked).
Crucially, the wage is also a function of y and V .
We solve the model using backward induction, and hence start with the adult

















These rst-order conditions establish an optimal x and y, x∗ and y∗. The consump-
tion of the numeraire is a function of the lifetime wealth, while the consumption of
y is a function of the income, the price of y, the stock of consumption capital S and
the stock of virtue V . We assume that in period I. the parent can solve the maxi-
mization problem of the future adult child, so she takes the optimal consumptions
as given. She maximizes the utility function
Vp = U(Cp) + aVc(x
∗(Wc(S)), y
∗(Wc(S), py, S, V, β(V ))). (65)





































The rst term within the main parenthesis is the increase in consumption due




Marginal utility stemming from the consumption of y decreases as V increases. The
third term captures the gain from a lower harmful consumption stock S, and has
two parts: the rst is a decrease in the consumption stock stemming from the direct
eect of V on the consumption of y, while the second one is a decrease due to
greater patience. We can conceptualize the eect of V on the consumption of the
harmful substance as the parent providing a substitute good for the substance. In
the standard rational addiction framework, with a consumption schedule c(S) and a
constant depreciation schedule c = δS, an increase in V , by decreasing consumption
at any period t, shifts the consumption schedule downwards, and leads to a lower
steady-state consumption level.
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6.2 Fully altruistic model with transfers and human capital
investments
The model consists of three periods. In period I the parent raises and socializes the
child, and invests in the child's human capital. In period II. the child is a young
adult and makes consumption choices, while earning an income. In period II. the
adult child is older and "reaps" the (positive and negative) returns of consumption
capital. We assume that the parent is alive throughout the three periods. In period
I she is "young", in period II. she is "middle aged", while in period III. she is "old".
Analytically, we rst solve for the optimal amount of human capital investment and
parental transfers in the third period, conditional on the amount of virtue and other
variables. Then we solve for the optimal amount of virtue. The marginal benet of
investing in virtue depends on its eect on the marginal return on human capital
investment.
6.2.1 Parental transfers
In the last period, the parent obviously does not make any investment decisions,
however, she may choose to transfer resources (t) to the middle-aged child. The

































We use the intertemporal budget constraint as the parent might transfer the resource
in the last period at the expense of consumption of earlier periods. Crucially, we
assume that the Vc
m(t) unction is concave, so the marginal utility of parental
transfers (to the parent) is greater when the income of the middle-aged child is
lower. This creates an "automatic" incentive for the parent to transfer resources to






































Due to the concavity of the parent's preferences regarding her own and the adult
child's consumption, if harmful addiction lowers the child's full income, the marginal
utility of transferring resources to the child increases. This, in turn, decreases
parental consumption, while at the same time increases the consumption of the
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harmfully addictive good by the child as he does not bear the full cost of consump-
tion. This problem has at least two possible "solutions: one is that, as in Becker
(1981/1991), parental altruism decreases if the child expected to behave ways the
parent disapproves of (the merit good case). Alternatively, the parent can spend
resources early on to dissuade the child from consuming harmful substances and
possibly also to consume goods that are benecially addictive.
6.2.2 Investment in human capital and in virtue
Apart from possibly transferring resources to the adult child, the parent will also
invest in the child's human capital. In period I. the parent decides how much to
invest in the child's human capital, while she also decides on how much to invest in
his virtue. Resouces spent on investing in human capital are notated by h. There is
complementarity between the two investments via two channels: rst, a greater level
of virtue induces the child to avoid harmful addictions which results in a higher life-
time income, which in turn increases the return on (general) human capital. Second,
investments in virtue reduces the optimal amount of parental transfers to middle-
aged children, which, in turn, increases the optimal amount spent on human capital








































The condition establishes an optimal level of human capital which depends on h,
which in turn depends on the adult wage, and indirectly on the consumption capital















































































The parent considers three eects of investing in moral character: spending
on V induces the adult child to earn more in adulthood directly as well as through
incentivizing human capital investments o the parent's part. This in turn decreases
the amount of money transferred by the parent to the adult hild. This directly
increases the consumption of the parent but decreases the utility of the child.
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6.3 Crime and punishment
we consider two model versions: in version I. the parent is paternalistic in that she
does not apply a positive discount rate over her child's life periods. In version II. the
parent is completely altruistic, however, as we show, she still has reasons to make
her (adult) child guilty about engaging in criminal activity. Let us consider the rst
case rst. Suppose an (adult) individual decides how much crime (x) she engages
in. Her utility function is
v(y) + b(x)− βpf(x)−m(x), (77)
where b is the (private) benet from crime, f is the punishment, p is the probability
of apprehension,m is the "moral cost of engaging in crime an β is the discount
factor. It can also be interpreted as guilt. We assume that b′(x) > 0, b′′(x) ≤ 0,
f ′(x) > 0, f ′′(x) > 0, m′(x) > 0 and m′′(x) > 0. The rst order condition with
respect to x can be expressed as
b′(x) = pf ′(x) +m′(x), (78)
that is, the marginal benet of crime equals the marginal cost. The optimal level
of crime can thus be written as a function x∗(p, f,m), so the indirect utility can be
written in the form
v(y) + b(x∗(β, p, f,m))− βpf(x∗(p, f,m))−m(x∗(p, f,m)). (79)
Now allow β andm to be inuenced by prior investment in virtue or moral character.
Assume a function m(V ), with m′(V ) > 0 and m′′(V ) ≤ 0 and a function β(V ),
with β′(V ) > 0 and β′′(V ) ≤ 0. Let g(v) be the cost of investing in virtue, with
g′(v) > 0 and g′′(v) > 0 and v being the input into the virtue production function.
As before, we assume that it is the parent who invest in her child's character, and
we notate parental altruism again by a. The parent maximizes
v(Cp) + a(v(y) + b(x
∗(β, p, f,m))− pf(x∗(β, p, f,m))−m(x∗(β, p, f,m), V )). (80)
As in the case of addiction, the parent does not discount across the child's life


































The bigger is the potential benet from crime, the lower the marginal benet of
investing in moral character. Notice also that there is some complementarity be-
tween f and m. The smaller m is, the greater x will be, which in turn increases the
punishment received for committing crime. This way a larger p or f increases the
incentive for investing in virtue by making it more costly to be a "criminal. The
last term, however, indicated that there is also substitution between f and m. A
higher f decreases x, so a lower m is needed to achieve the same level of deterrence.
Now consider the case without parental paternalism, and with the possibility
of (general) human capital investment by the parent. The adult child in this version
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of the model chooses how much time to devote to crime and how much to work. His
utility function can be written as
Wi(ti) +Wl(h, tl)− βpf(ti)− βm(ti). (82)
The adult child maximizes his utility function with respect to ti and tl. From this
we get the indirect utility function
Vc = Wi(ti(β, p, f,m)) +Wl(h, tl(β, p, f,m, h))−
β(pf(ti(β, p, f,m)) +m(V, ti(β, p, f,m))).
(83)
The parent then takes this indirect utility function and substitutes it into her own
utility function:
Vp = u(Cp) + a[Wi(ti(Wl(h), β, p, f,m(V ))) +Wl(h, tl(Wl(h), β, p, f,m(V ), h))−
β(pf(ti(,Wl(h), β, p, f,m(V ))) +m(v, ti(Wl(h), β, p, f,m(V ))))].
(84)
The parent here is not paternalistic, so she uses the same discount factor the child
uses. The parent maximizes utility with respect to v. A higher level of v increases the
adult child's time spent working and decreases the time spent on criminal activity.
Taking all this as given, the parent chooses how much resources to devote on building
the child's human capital. Importantly, we assume that (general) human capital is
useful in legal but not in illegal work activity. Thus, we have Wi
′(h) > 0 and
Wi
′′(h) < 0. The rst-order condition with respect to h is
∂Wl
∂h
tl = λ. (85)
As the resources spent on "virtue" increase tl, they also increase the left-hand-side
of the rst-order condition. For the equality to hold, ∂Wl
∂h
needs to decrease, which
occurs if h increases. We thus showed that investing more in virtue capital leads to
more investment in (labor augmenting) human capital. Notice that the amount of
human capital in itself leads to a higher tl (and corresponding lower ti) chosen, so in
a paternalistic model investing in human capital would be another lever the parents
could use to discourage their children from crime.
6.4 Moral character as a commitment tool
First, we we consider a simple monetary transaction, with one unit of a good being
oered for sale. The buyer values the good at V , while it costs the seller C to sell the
good. Assume V > C. Then there is some p at which the transaction should take
place. Suppose, however, that the law is weakly enforced, so that either the seller
or the buyer can act dishonestly. Let us consider the buyer's position. If she simply
takes the good and does not pay for it, she gains p, the price. Without commitment,
however, the seller will not be willing to undergo the transaction, as doing so will
see her lose C. One way to establish a commitment is to invest in "guilt capital,
that produces a level of guilt G if the individual behaves dishonestly. How much G
is necessary to achieve full commitment? Obviously, a level that is sucient to deter
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the buyer from stealing the good, that is, G = p. Suppose it costs D to produce
this level of guilt. If there are n possible transactions over the buyer's lifetime, the
buyer gains n(V − p) by investing in guilt capital that produces G = p when she
behaves dishonestly.
Now consider a very simple principal-agent problem with V (e) being the value for
the principle derived from the agent attending to her task, w is the wage or other
type of payment paid by the principle to the agent, e is the monetary equivalent of
the (eort) cost of attending to the task diligently and m(V ) is the monetary equiv-
alent of the "moral cost of shirking. The moral cost depends on prior investments
in honesty. Let p be the probability of the agent nishing the task if she works
diligently, and let q be the probability that she will be successful even if she shirks
in her duties. The agent's utility if she works diligently is pW −e, while if she shirks
it is qW −m(V ). The agent works diligently if and only if
pW − e ≥ qW −m. (86)





The wage, unsurprisingly, decreases in m.
Now consider a parent's decision to invest in her child's honesty. We assume
that the adult child enters a competitive labor market. That is, we can treat W ∗ as
given from the parent's perspective. Given that e, p and q are exogenously given,
the only "moving variable is m. However, as agents are wage-takers, they will take
the m already established in the market as given. Let us call this level of m m∗. If
an agent has m > m∗, and the value of m is common knowledge, she will not get
the job. m is, of course, is taken as given by her, but the same is not true of her
parent. The parent has the following problem: if she invests suciently in her child's
"honesty capital, so that m ≥ m∗, the child will get a job, otherwise the child will
not nd employment. Let h∗ be the amount of honesty that will get m = m∗. Then
if W ∗l − e(l) ≥ C(h∗) the parent will teach her child to be honest, otherwise she
makes no such investment.
Now consider a labor market with imperfect competition, with the agent hav-
ing some degree of market power over the principal. Then, the agent does not take
W as given. In particular, W 6= W ∗, instead, a markup is added on W ∗. The agent
thus faces a downward-sloping residual demand curve. A greater m will both in-
crease the employment chance of the agent, but at the same time it will decrease her
wage. Thus, the marginal benet from investing in honesty is W ′(h) + l′(h)− e(l),
where W ′(h) < 0 and l′(h) > 0. How much the adult child will gain by being honest
depends on the elasticity of demand for her services. Nevertheless, she will gain
on net given that a monopolist always operates at the section of the demand curve
where demand is elastic. Therefore, we can assume an elastic demand at the rele-
vant interval, thus making investment in honesty always having a positive marginal
benet. The marginal benet is, however, always lower than in the case of compe-
tition. Thus we can arrive at a perhaps not so surprising, but nevertheless novel
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conclusion: competition increases incentives to invest in one's or one's children's
honesty. The more elastic the agent's residual demand curve is, the more she gains
by being known to be honest.
6.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we analyzed investments by parents in their children's values or
"virtue capital. In particular, we sketched three simple models of such investments:
one considering investments in good consumption habits, one analyzing the inter-
action of criminal punishment and the creation of attitudes about crime and one
dealing with virtue capital as a commitment device. We also provided a reconsid-
eration of what are termed "guilt, "shame and "honor cultures. In summary,
we pointed out a number of complementarities between various ways of inuencing
human conduct, and between various forms of (cognitive and non-cognitive) human
capital. The models we presented can each be improved and extended further, hence,
this chapter serves as a starting point for potential future research.
7 Summary
In each of the preceding ve essays we presented models of applying the economic
way of thinking with everyday problems, as well as problems not yet analyzed in
the economic literature. In the rst essay we considered the problem of information
aversion in a market context. Information aversion has been shown to be important
in a number of areas. The novelty of our essay is the put the problem into a context
of market equilibrium. We showed that information aversion induced misinformation
can be an equilibrium outcome, however, how strongly it manifests itself is sensitive
to market incentives as well as the opportunity to use the court system.
The second essay considered the eects of the exit of Uber from the Hungarian
market on bicycle sharing usage. Somewhat counterintuitively, we found that the
exit decreased BSS usage among regular users. This suggests that many use bicycle
sharing as part of a multimodal pattern of transportation use.
The third essay is concerned with investments by parents in general and
industry-specic human capital for their children. In particular, we found that how
early specialization takes place depends on uncertainty over future potential rents.
The main implications of the model is that both very high achievers in one particular
area ("superstars) and general low-achievers will specialize relatively early, while
general "good students will delay specialization and invest relatively more in gen-
eral skills. Both superstar specialization and general investments increase in market
size as well as in better information ows. Our investigations led to us uncovering
interesting tradeos between investment eciency and talent allocation in certain
cases, and shed light on the history and practice of hereditary occupations and the
sexual division of labor.
In the fourth chapter we rst examine the incentives of parents to create su-
pernatural beliefs (such as a belief in Santa Claus) in their children. In our model
parents do so in order to inuence their ospring's behavior. Supernatural beliefs
help parents to overcome what otherwise would be a commitment problem on their
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part. In the remainder of the chapter we sketch a model of supernatural persua-
sion by the leader of a country. In the model the leader "co-opts "the Church to
bundle religious services with messages aimed at discouraging citizens from stealing
and other unproductive activities and steer them toward productive activities. In
particular, the harder it is to enforce laws, the more leaders will rely on religious
and other forms of persuasion.
The last chapter contains research that is a work in progress. It presents models
analyzing parents' decisions to build "moral character in their children. Investing in
these character traits becomes more important when individuals' actions are harder
to observe. Furthermore, we show that there exist interesting complementarities
between character-building and other ways of inuencing individual behavior. For
instance, stricter punishments may incentivize parents to steer their child away from
becoming a criminal in the future. There is also complementarity between character
traits and general human capital. For example, steering the child away from using
drugs as an adult increases the lifetime income of the child which in turn increases
the rate of return on general human capital investments.
Finally let us mention a few directions in which the research presented in this
thesis can be improved upon. We are still working on providing a model of specic
and general human capital accumulation that uses explicit functions instead of the
implicit ones used in Chapter 3. Such a move would sacrice some generality, but
would add tractability and would yield more precise comparative statics results.
Chapter 4 would benet from extending the analysis of religious persuasion to in-
clude the provision of educational services by governments and churches. Finally,
the results from Chapter 5 could form the bases of more than one future publica-
tions. It is for that reason as well that we welcome any comments, criticisms and
suggestions on this draft of our thesis.
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